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On Feb. 28, Brazil's Finance Minister, Paulo Haddad, resigned from his post along with most of his
top aides and the head of the Central Bank, Gustavo Loyola. Haddad is the second finance minister
to resign since December due to disagreements with President Itamar Franco over economic policy,
and his departure thrust the country into a new political crisis. Business associations and most
political parties now fear Franco will opt for "shock therapy" to control inflation, while blocking
or rolling back free market reforms. Even if Franco rejects such measures, most businessmen and
politicians say confidence in the government among domestic and foreign investors is severely
eroded. Since January, Haddad and Franco clashed repeatedly over methods to control inflation the
Brazilian economy's Achilles' heel. The consumer price index rose at about 25% per month in 1992,
with accumulated annual inflation by year-end officially estimated at 1,150%. The government's
soaring fiscal deficit estimated at US$18 billion this year, or 4% of GDP is considered the central
cause of hyperinflation. Since taking office in December, Haddad drew up a program to slash
the deficit in the medium term, while enforcing strict monetary policies to control inflation in
the short term. The central measures included a broad tax reform that could earn up to US$12
billion in extra revenue this year, rapid privatization of state enterprises, and renegotiation of the
foreign debt to ease repayment and attract sorely needed loans. Nevertheless, since most of those
measures would not be implemented until mid-year, Haddad admitted that hyperinflation would
continue throughout the first half of 1993. The minister did raise interest rates early this year to
slow the rise in prices, but in January monthly inflation still climbed to 30.35% up from 25.58%
in December and in February it again topped 28%. In fact, one independent study submitted to
President Franco for review in late January warned that monthly inflation could reach 50% in the
next few months if immediate measures to control prices are not implemented. As a result, Franco
repeatedly criticized Haddad for discarding short-term measures to lower inflation, rejecting
high interest rates as an "ineffective" policy which only slows growth. Instead, the president
favored price controls on selected consumer goods, combined with a government crackdown on
hoarding and speculation to temporarily reduce inflation until the proposed fiscal reforms and other
structural changes take effect. "Up until now, we've just been putting bandages on the problem of
inflation," said Franco in early February. "Since the policies so far are not working, we obviously
need stronger remedies." In particular, the president advocated price controls on medicines and
basic grains, directly accusing the pharmaceutical and food industries of artificially raising prices.
He even threatened to introduce harsh consumer protection laws that would impose heavy fines
and even jail sentences on speculators. "They are like rebellious children," said Franco of food
and pharmaceutical businessmen. "They do not understand reason, and in such cases it's better
that we treat them like children and confine them to playpens." Nevertheless, given Haddad's
stubborn refusal to implement such measures, by the end of February the president ordered the
minister to lower inflation within 90 days or resign. "The country cannot tolerate the present levels
of inflation indefinitely," said Franco on Feb. 27. "In the end it will not be the president of the
republic who forces the minister's departure, it will be inflation." One day later, Haddad resigned,
along with most of his aides at the Finance Ministry, plus Central Bank head Gustavo Loyola. The
cabinet shakeup thrust the country into political crisis, since Haddad commanded wide respect
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among business associations and political organizations, which regarded his presence in the cabinet
as essential to carry forward free market reforms and offset the "populist" policies favored by
Franco (see Chronicle 01/07/93, 02/04/93). "This resignation is definitely a negative," said Luis
R. Luis, the chief macroeconomist with Scudder Stevens & Clark Inc., a Boston-based manager
of Latin American investment funds. "Despite uncertainty about Franco, Haddad had begun to
make progress in the stabilization of Brazil's economy, and in building confidence in Brazil." Not
surprisingly, the crisis threw Brazil's financial markets into a tailspin. On March 1, the Sao Paulo
stock exchange fell by 5.6%, while the Rio de Janeiro market dropped 4.1%. The prices for gold
and the dollar rose, with the foreign exchange rate jumping 2.5%. Rather than short term financial
jitters, most business and political organizations warn that Haddad's resignation may now usher
in a period of chronic instability. The lack of consistent government economic policies and goals
discourages investors, who complain that the constant turnover in Franco's economic cabinet makes
it impossible to plan medium to long term investments. Indeed, Haddad is the second finance
minister to resign. Haddad's predecessor, Gustavo Krausse, also quit over disagreements with
the President in December, making Haddad's replacement Eliseu Resende, who was appointed to
the post on March 1 the third minister since Franco took office in October. "The lack of economic
definition and orientation is pushing the country backwards," said Omar Carneiro, president of
Shell oil company in Brazil. "Regardless of who is in the post, three finance ministers in three
months is extremely worrisome, and it damages the country's credibility abroad." According to
Carneiro, Shell "substantially reduced" its planned investments for 1993 given the insecurity that
reigns in the country. In fact, the Texaco oil company is also reconsidering its plan to invest US
$30 million this year to upgrade existing gas stations and construct new ones. "We had already
sent our investment plans to stock holders, but now we're reconsidering the entire project given
the changing conditions," said Texaco's vice- president, Paulo Kastrup. Perhaps more concerning
than the cabinet instability is growing distrust of Franco within the private sector. Most business
associations fear that, without Haddad as a counterbalance, the President will now block free market
reforms while implementing economic "shock measures" to control inflation, such as an across the
board wage and price freeze. On March 2, for example, Franco ordered his new Finance Minister
to freeze prices for a month on selected food products, including rice, beans, wheat, and sugar.
And, although the sale of some state firms will likely go forward, most economists expect Franco
to immediately scrap the radical privatization plans drawn up by Haddad. The former minister
planned to initiate a massive privatization thrust on May 1, whereby the government would sell
off the majority of the state's 159 firms in a period of two months. Haddad predicted the plan
would cut monthly inflation in half by July, since inefficient state enterprises are the central cause
of the government's budget deficit. According to official estimates, this year state companies are
projected to lose US$5 billion through waste and inefficiency, while spending about US$6 billion
to service domestic and foreign debts that total US$93.3 billion. Just in the first two months of 1992,
the Central Bank provided US$400 million of its reserves to enable state companies to keep up
payments to international creditors. But rather than sell off public enterprises, Franco will likely
attempt to simply reel in expenditures to reduce the deficit. In late February, for example, Franco
ordered an investigation into the activities of state firms to trim the fat, and slashed the salaries of
most company executives by 50%. Nevertheless, the President simultaneously authorized a US$300
million investment to revitalize the state-owned shipping company Lloyd, ignoring technical studies
that demonstrate the company is bankrupt. The 100- year old firm employs about 1,100 workers for
just two ships, and last year the company reported US$65 million in losses. "The change in ministers
suggests the populist tendency of Franco's government will be accentuated," said Carlos Langoni,
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a consultant and former Central Bank president. "Though I don't think the new Minister Resende
will try magic solutions, there could be an increase in the unorthodox flavor of economic policy." In
fact, Franco's decision to appoint Resende as Haddad's replacement contributed to private sector
fears, since most economists believe the President deliberately chose an official who would obey
orders, giving Franco more direct control over economic policy. Resende is a civil engineer not an
economist. In his first press conference, the Minister declared, "I am a soldier of the President and
I will do what he orders." The growing distrust and insecurity over Franco's policies now threaten
to end the President's honeymoon with Congress. In January, the legislature initiated a period of
"extraordinary sessions" to immediately review the executive's tax reform and other measures to
slash the fiscal deficit. Since February, in an effort to cooperate with the Franco administration, the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate approved a controversial 0.25% tax on financial transactions
(such as checks), which the executive estimates will earn at least US$7 billion in added revenue
annually once collected. But following Haddad's resignation, even pro-government senators warned
that any new tax legislation and other economic reform bills will meet stiff resistance until the
government clarifies its economic program. "I've decided to join the opposition in Congress because
the President seems like a child in economic matters," said Dejandir Dalpasqualle, a senator from
the Social Democrat Party (Partido Democratico Social, PDS). "A climate of confusion and insecurity
reigns in Congress now." The President may also fight an uphill battle to reach a new accord with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which Haddad had been negotiating since December.
In mid- 1992, a standby agreement with the IMF for US$2.1 billion was suspended when former
president Fernando Collor de Mello failed to meet accord commitments, such as a promise to
reduce inflation to 2% per month. In mid-February, Haddad met with IMF officials in Washington
to reopen negotiations to free up the frozen funds, and on March 1 an IMF team arrived in the
country to evaluate the Franco administration's economic program. Given the cabinet shakeup,
however, the IMF's stamp of approval will likely be postponed in the short to medium term. "Under
the circumstances, any substantial talks with the IMF will have to be put on hold," said Alexandre
Barros, a Brasilia-based financial consultant and political risk analyst. "It is likely that things will get
worse." [Sources: Deutsch Press Agentur, 02/01/93, 02/02/93; Inter Press Service, 01/27/93, 02/04/93,
02/17/93; Notimex, 02/08/93, 02/27/93, 03/01/93; Chinese news service Xinhua, 02/09/93, 02/17/93,
03/02/93; Financial Times (London), 02/18/93, 03/02/93; New York Times, Wall Street Journal,
03/02/93; Christian Science Monitor, 03/03/93; Agence France-Presse, 02/02-04/93, 02/10/93, 02/12/93,
02/16-18/93, 02/25/93, 02/26/93, 03/01/93-03/02/93, 03/04/93, 03/06/93; Spanish news service EFE,
01/30/93, 02/13/93, 02/28/93, 03/01-03/93, 03/07/93]
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